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I. IDEAS DERIVING FROM ARABIC LOGIC 
That Ramon Lull was, at the beginning of his career, strongly influenced 
by the Islamic tradition of Aristotelian logic is an incontrovertible fact. 
One of the very first works which Lull composed was the Compendium lo- 
gicae Algazelis, a compendium based on a treatise on logic written by al- 
Ghazáli, a Persian theologian roughly contemporary with Anselm of Canter- 
bury. Some years ago, I was able to show that Lull based this work on the 
treatise on logic from al-Ghazáli's Maqüsid al-falüsifa, an Aristotelian ency- 
clopedia based in turn on Avicenna's Persian Dünish nümeh. The works of 
Avicenna and al-Ghaziili are both made up of three treatises: logic, meta- 
physics, and natural philosophy. Al-Ghazáli's intention in making his adap- 
tation of Avicenna's work was to refute its teaching, a task he undertook in 
his celebrated Tahüfut al-falüsifa or <cDestruction of the Philosophers,,. 
We do not know whether Lull was acquainted with al-Ghazáli's intention 
nor whether ke knew the Tahüfut al-tahüfut or ccDestruction of the Destruc- 
tionn of Averroes which it called forth. His work covered, in any event, only 
the section on logic. His compendium was based on the Arabic original of 
Al-Ghazáli's work and was itself composed in Arabic. In its original form it 
seems to have been arranged in three sections: 1) On Universals, 2) On Pro- 
positions. 3) On Argumentation, following the division of logic according 
the three operations of the mind which had been introduced by Avicenna. 
Later -around the year 1290- when he was in the city of Montpellier, 
Lull translated this original compendium into Latin, adding material on the 
predicables, the categories, the figures of the syllogism, and the fallacies 
which he took from the standard Latin textbook on logic, the Summulae lo- 
gicales of Peter of Spain. His later Logica del Gatzel is a Catalan adaptation 
of the Compendium made for those who knew neither Arabic nor Latin. 
This influence of Islamic logic on the early Lull is generally recognized. 
But it seems that the mature Lull continued his study of Arabic sources and 
that these sources influenced not only his understanding of Aristotelian lo- 
gic, but also the development of his own Ars magna. 
In this paper I should like to enumerate severa1 specific notions in the Lo- 
gica nova of 1303 which can, with some probability, be ascribed to the in- 
fluence of Arabic logic, before going on to discuss the way in which Lull in- 
tegrated these notions into his own logic and the Art itself. 
Let us recall briefly the contents of the Logica nova. After a short intro- 
duction, the first distinction replaces the traditional arbor porphyriana with 
a division of substantial being into the nine subjects of the Art; accidental 
being is divided among other things into accidents which are proper and ap- 
propriated. This first distinction also discusses nine questions which are 
meant to be an aid in the process of scientific discovery. The second and 
third distinctions reinterpret the Porphyrian predicables and the Aristotelian 
categories in function of Lull's own dynamic conception of reality by ap- 
plying the nine questions to each of them. The fourth distinction provides a 
philosophical lexicon, containing a hundred definitions, of which the first 
eighteen match the nine absolute and nine relative principles of the Art. The 
fifth distinction presents Lull's theory of the syllogism and scientific proof in 
the light of his conception of the relationship between theology and philo- 
sophy. The sixth applies this new methodology to the concept of nature and 
the four faculties ot theology, philosophy, law, and medicine. The seventh 
and last distinction lists a great number of questions which may be answered 
by means of the new logic; this distinction amounts to a sort of index to the 
whole work. 
The doctrine of first and second intention 
The introduction to the Logica nova explains Lull's reasons for wanting to 
compose a new logic. He criticizes the prolixity and uncertainty of traditional 
logic and maintains that a new logic must take account of both first and se- 
cond intentions. A new logic must be a ccphilosophical logic,,, providing a 
<<natural>> knowledge not only of second, but also of first intentions. 
The Latin Scholastics employed the terms ccfirst>> and ccsecond intention,, 
to define the subject-matter of logic. They distinguished between concepts of 
things-and concepts of concepts. They called concepts of things ccfirst inten- 
tions,, and concepts of concepts ccsecond intentions,,. Logic, in their unders- 
tanding, concerned itself with concepts of concepts or ccsecond intentiom,,, 
and was thus distinguished from philosophy, which deals with concepts of 
things. This distinction seems to have been introduced in Arabic philosophy 
by al-F8ribi and have become known in the West through the Latin transla- 
tions of Avicenna. 
But al-Fárábi's use of these terms represented only a special case of more 
general distinction common in Arabic philosophy. In Arabic authors the dis- 
tinction between the two types of intention was used in a much broader way. 
The terms ccaccording to the first intention,, and eaccording to the second 
intention,, seem to have been used originally in the Arabic translations of 
Aristotle where they stand simply for ccprimarily, in the first place,, and <ciri 
the second place,,. 
In Muslim works like the Encyclopedia of the Brethren of Purity -a sort 
of gnostic sect, active at Basra around the end of the tenthy century- much 
use was made of this distinction, but in a rather more specific form. In this 
form, the term ccfirst intention,, takes on the meaning ccessentially>>, whereas 
the term ccsecond intention,, means ccaccidentallyv or c<by chance,,. Applied 
to the question of the divine knowledge, for example, God knows himself 
ccaccording to the first intention,, and in this knowledge knows the world ecac- 
cording to the second intention,,. Applied to the divine action of creating the 
world, God's first intention can not be anything outside himself, but as a se- 
cond intention his action causes the world. 
Lull's use of the terms ccfirstn and ccsecond intention)) seems to be related 
to this original Arabic distinction rather than to the Scholastic distinction in 
logic. In his earliest works he used the distinction in the sphere of ethics: 
God should be loved <caccording to the first intentiom, that is, for himself; 
all other things are to be loved ccaccording to the second intention,, or as a 
means to the first intention. But he soon applied the distinction in other 
areas as well, to the theory of the elements, to the problem of the relation- 
ship between faith and reason, and to the theory of knowledge. 
In the Logica nova he applied the distinction to the problem of what logic 
is. This application is fundamental for the understanding of the newness of 
the Logica nova. Lull's ccphilosophical logic,, deals less with the problem of 
the correctness of reasoning than it does with the problem of the theory of 
knowledge. 
ccAccording to the first intentiom the object of the knowing intellect can 
only be intellectual things. It is only ccaccording to the second intention,, that 
knowledge is concerned with the sensible things which it finds in this world. 
We will discuss this application of the Arabic distinction between the first 
and second intention more fully later on. 
The doctrine of the nine subjects 
Distinction I,  chapters 1-2, of the Logica nova contains Lull's doctrine of 
the nine subjects which make up all of reality: God, angel, heaven, man, 
imaginative , sensitive, vegetative , elementative , and instrumentative things . 
This doctrine made its first appearance in the Ars inventiva in connection 
with a rule concerning three (positive, comparative, and superlative) degrees 
of knowledge. The doctrine played an important role in the final systemati- 
zation of the Art in the Ars generalis ultima. 
In the Logica nova, Distinction I, chapter 2, Lull explains how the nine 
subjects are derived. Substance, he tells us, is either incorporeal or corpo- 
real. Incorporeal substance is made up of divine, angelical, and rational 
substance; corporeal substance of celestial, imaginative, sensitive, vegetati- 
ve, and elemental substance. 
This doctrine is clearly related to the Neoplatonic scheme of emanations 
from the One by way of Mind and Sou1 to Nature. The 'Neoplatonic scheme 
very early found its way into Islamic philosophy, generally in a form in which 
it was expanded into nine stages. A nine-fold emanation is found in the .en- 
cyclopedias of the Brethren of Purity, Avicenna, and other authors. 
The Brethren list the following subjects: God, intellect, soul, first matter, 
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nature, second matter, the celestial spheres, the elements, and the natural 
things of this world. The Budd al-'árif of Ibn Sab'in, a Sufi mystic of Murcia 
and somewhat earlier contemporary of Lull, is clearly dependent on this list. 
It divides existents into universal and particular things and defines universal 
things as comprising nine unities: God, intellect, soul, nature, matter, matter 
in three dimensions, the celestial spheres, the four elements, and the natural 
things of this world. 
Although Lull, as a Christian, had to reject the idea of necessary emana- 
tions from God, his idea of nine subjects seems clearly related to the Neopla- 
tonic scheme in its Arabic form. He could have learned of this form of the 
doctrine from various sources, but there are severa1 indications that his im- 
mediate source was a work like that of Ibn Sab'in. 
The list of corporeal substances and especially the principle of division for 
their enumeration are similar in Lull and Ibn Sab'in. Like Lull, Ibn Sab'in 
divided corporeal substances into celestial and natural substances, and natu- 
ral substances into composed (sensitive, vegetative, and mineral) and simple 
(elemental) substances. 
Something like Ibn Sab'in's division of incorporeal substance into in- 
tellect, soul, intelligible forms, and first matter is quite possibly behind the 
idea of a primordial chaos from which all things emerge -an idea which Lull 
developed in his Liber chaos, an appendix to the Ars dernonstrativa, and 
then in various later works. 
The inspiration for one of Lull's most important ideas seems also to derive 
from Ibn Sab'in's version of the Neoplatonic scheme of emanations. In his 
treatise De ascensu et descensu intellectus Lull describes how it is possible to 
ascend through the various subjects to the divinity. In a similar way, Ibn 
Sab'in follows up his own enumeration of the nine unities with the idea that 
it is possible to ascend from the particular things of this world through the 
nine universal things to the divinity and thence descend again from these 
universals to particular things. As an example of this ascent, Ibn Sab'Pn 
shows how the mind may rise from stone to plant, thence to animal nature 
and rational soul, and finally by way of the active intellect to the separate in- 
tellect -a process much like that which Lull describes in the De ascensu et 
descensu intellectus. 
The doctrine of proper and appropriated accidents 
Distinction I, chapter 3, of the Logica nova divides accidents into proper 
and appropriated. Accidents like the warmness of fire are proper; the dry- 
ness which earth gives to fire is an appropriated accident. This distinction is 
related to the distinction between first and second intention. The first inten- 
tion of any action is substantial and essential and its end or final cause; the 
second intention is accidental and by chance and the material cause or means 
to the end. Lull calls the end of an action the c<first intention,, and compares 
it to the fruit of a tree, while giving the name ccsecond intention,, to the 
means to the end, the tree itself. Proper accidents are ends and pertain to 
the first intention of an action; appropriated accidents are means to the ends 
and pertain to the second intention. 
A similar distinction is made by the philosophical Encyclopedia of the 
Brethren of Purity. According to this work the first, essential intention of an 
action is its proper end; the second, accidental intention is not the proper 
end, but that which is for the sake of the proper end. The authors explain, 
for example, that the first intention of the creator in creating is the perma- 
nence and welfare of creatures, whereas corruption and pain are accidental 
and due to the imperfection of matter, which is the means to that end. 
In the same way, Lull held that each element has a <<proper)) quality - 
warmth in fire- due to its <<natural>> action in accordance with its first inten- 
tion and an c<appropriated>> quality -the dryness of fire- due to its <<contin- 
gent>> action in accordance with the second intention. 
These distinctions played an important role not only in the development of 
Lull's theory of the elements, but also in his epistemology and theory of ins- 
trumentality. They are essential, as we shall see, fot the understanding of his 
conception of what a <<philosophical ogic)) should be. 
The doctrine of the nine fundamental questions 
Distinction I, chapters 6-16, of the Logica nova lists nine fundamental 
questions: utrum, quid, de quo, quare, quantum, quale, quando, ubi, quo 
modolcum quo. These questions were substituted in the Tabula generalis for 
the rules for philosophical research which had been listed in the fifth distinc- 
tion of the Ars inventiva. 
In the Analytica posteriora Aristotle had enumerated four such questions: 
ccwhether),, <<what>), ccof what sort)), and ~ w h y ~ .  In the tradition of the Latin 
Scholastics these questions lost a great dea1 of their importance, although 
two of them, the questions quid and quale, do appear in the discussion of the 
predicables in connection with the theory of definition in works like the 
Surnmulae logicales of Peter of Spain. 
Lull could have found all of the nine questions in the Encyclopedia of the 
Brethren of Purity or the Budd al-'árifof .Ibn Sab'in. The latter added to the 
discussion of the nine questions which he himself found in the Brethren re- 
marks on the order in which the questions are to be asked and their applica- 
bility to God. 
Lull's list could have been derived from either of these sources. It matches 
both of them with but two exceptions. Lull substituted a question de quo for 
their question < < w h o ~  and added a question cum quo to the question <<in what 
mariner>> found in these sources, possibly as a result of reflection on the no- 
tes on c<being with,) appended by Ibn Sab'in to his treatment of the catego- 
ries. 
The idea of a dictionary of philosophical terminology 
Distinction IV of the Logica nova provides a philosophical lexicon, contai- 
ning a hundred definitions. The first eighteen of these match the absolute 
and relative principles of the Art, the remaining definitions concern various 
aspects of change in nature. Similar lexica are found in the Arbre de sciencia, 
the Ars generalis ultima, and other works of Lull. 
The idea of a lexicon of philosophical terminology derives, of course, from 
Aristotle himself. In the fifth book of the Metaphysics, for example, the phi- 
losopher lists and explains a great many technical terms. Other works con- 
tain similar lists. 
In the Latin traditionof High Scholasticism, however, the idea of a dictio- 
nary of philosophical terminology did not appear unti1 very late. In the thir- 
teenth century the tendency to systematization was too strong. In his com- 
mentary on the Metaphysics Thomas Aquinas does not treat Aristotle's fifth 
book as a lexicon, but seeks rather to discover some system behind the list 
of terms. 
Among the Muslims, however, such dictionaries represented a literary 
form which was very common. In their Encyclopedia the Brethren of Purity 
supplied a long list of definitions at the end of their treatment of definition 
and description. Ibn Sab'in added at the end of his logic a dictionary of the 
technical terms used by jurists, theologians, philosophers, and mystics. 
It was undoubtedly in imitation of such models that Lull included a fourth 
distinction concerning 100 forms in his Logica nova. 
The doctrine of the types of scientific proposition 
Distinction V, chapter 1, of the Logica nova distinguishes thirteen types of 
proposition according to their probative force. Five types of proposition 
meet the requirements of demoiistrative science: axioms, propositions which 
contain their own proof, sense-data, data of immediate experience, and tra- 
ditionally accepted statements. Eight other types of proposition are of use 
only in rhetorical and dialectical types of argumentation. 
This classification is already found in Lull's early Compendium logicae Al-  
gazelis -a fact which makes its source certain since al-Ghazáli's work is ba- 
sed on Avicenna's Persian Dcinish ncirneh. Avicenna's enumeration of va- 
rious types of proposition according to their probative force represents a de- 
velopment which is posterior to the Encyclopedia of the Brethren of Purity. 
Its inclusion in the Budd al-'drif of Ibn Sab'in provides a valuable hint as to 
the philosophical and theological context in which both he and Lull wrote. 
Avicenna's classification of propositions had its origin in the reform which 
he proposed for Islamic theology. Avicenna admitted that probable opi- 
nions, conjectures, and propositions accepted on faith could be employed in 
the argumentation of the jurists, but he denied that their argumentation 
could rise above the level of dialectic or rhetoric. 
In the work which is the source of al-Ghaziili's logic, Avicenna proposed 
that theology be reformed in accordance with Aristotle's ideal of a demons- 
trative science, so that it is a strict science based on true and certain premis- 
ses and proceeding by syllogistic deduction. As a part of this reform, Avicen- 
na distinguished thirteen types of proposition, classifying them according to 
the Arabic canon of Aristotle7s works on logic into propositions which could 
be used in scientific, rhetorical, dialectical, and sophistic argumentation. 
The fact that both Ibn Sab'in and Lull --originally independently of one 
another- included Avicenna's classification of propositions according to 
their probative force in their works is revealing. Both the Muslim Sufi of 
Murcia and the Latin <<artista>> of Majorca thought of theology not as separa- 
te from philosophy, but rather as strict sciences, forming parts of a scientific 
encyclopedia. Theology is that part of the encyclopedia of philosophical dis- 
ciplines, in which the teachings of faith are demonstrated. 
It was in this context that Lull took up Avicenna7s list and -shortly after 
the composition of the Logica nova- made his repeated efforts to find a 
method by which opinative syllogisms could be transformed into demonstra- 
tive ones. The new method of demonstration, the novus modus demonstran- 
di, which he elaborated in his last works, is the culmination of this effort. 
The doctrine of ccthe fallacy of contradiction)> 
Distinction V, chapter 14, of the Logica nova deals with the fallacies. It 
concludes with the formulation of a new type of fallacy, not known to Aris- 
totle. Lull described this fallacy as crthe fallacy of contradiction>>. It proceeds 
by opposing two contradictory statements and concluding to the truth of one 
of them, generally by showing the meaning of one of the propositions to be 
equivocal. 
The theme of contradiction had fascinated Lull since the period when he 
composed his early Compendium logicae Algazelis. The theme gained in- 
creasing importance from the time of the Logica nova on, as he was confron- 
ted with the standpoint of the Latin theologians who maintained that the 
doctrines of the faith could not be proved. The <<fallacy of contradictionn 
then developed into the cctwentieth fallacy>>, then into the method of <<con- 
tradictor~ syllogisms>>, and finally into the novus modus demonstrandi. 
The method of the reductio ad absurdum was known to Aristotle, but in 
the history of Islamic theology it gained great importance because of the at- 
tempts of some theologians to mediate between the views of the orthodox 
and those of the Mu'tazilite sect which was inclined to use philosophy in 
theology. The methodology of theses theologians consisted in the dialectical 
confrontation of two opinions, concluding either with the affirmation or de- 
nial of one of the opinions or with a distinction. 
For example, where the orthodox understood the Quran's reference to 
God's hearing literally and the Mu'tazilites rejected it, the theologians distin- 
guished, claiming that God hears, but not as men do. In this dialectical ap- 
proach they made considerable use of the reductio ad absurdum. For exam- 
ple, they proved that the divine properties are not identical with the divine 
essence in the following way: If the properties were identical with the essen- 
ce, then tiiere would contradictory properties (say mercy and justice) in the 
one essence. But this is impossible; therefore.. . 
This method of argumentation will be familiar to readers of Lull's late 
works. It is the basis for his novus modus demonstrandi. 
II. LULL'S  USE O F A R A B I C  LOGZC 
Thus Ramon Lull appropriated for his own purposes a great many ideas 
from an Islamic tradition in logic which were not accessible to his Latin con- 
temporaries. But his use of these ideas in his own logic and in developing his 
Ars magna completely transformed their meaning. 
In accordance with his apologetic purpose Lull introduced a category in 
the history of metaphysics which was completely new. He spoke not only of 
principles of being, but also of principles of action. 
Taking his departure from a point which his Islamic partners in dialogue 
admitted, the dynamism of the process of knowledge (the knowing intellect, 
the known object, and the act of knowledge) and love (the lover, the belo- 
ved, and love itself), Lull maintained that we must admit the activity of all 
the divine perfections. True goodness must produce something good; true 
greatness must produce something great. 
Because action pressuposes a principle or source, that which is produced, 
and a bond between them, he spoke not only of the dignities, but also of 
their acts and the <<correlatives>> of their action. To designate these correlati- 
ves, he formed new words which appear strange in Latin and were probably 
formed on the analogy of the forms of the Arabic verb. In a sermon given 
in Tunis he explained: 
Actus ... bonitatis dico bonificativum, bonificabile, bonificare; actus etiam 
magnitudinis sunt magnificativum, magnificabile, magnificare; et sic de aliis 
omnibus divinis dignitatibus. 
Lull generalised this idea to the extent that he could speak even of the abs- 
tract moments of activity as -tivum, -bile and -are. He defined these mo- 
ments as substantial and intrinsic principles of action which are valid for all 
reality. Because the correlative principles are intrinsic to all activity, action 
and passion are not, as in Aristotle, accidental. For Lull, being and activity 
both belong to the substance of things and are identical. 
In this way Lull was able to recognise images of the triune Christian God 
in all aspects of the created world, in the form, matter and conjunction 
which make up corporeal things; in the form, subject and property which 
constitute the nature of the angels; and even in the three dimensions of bo- 
dies and the two premisses and one conclusion of the syllogism -above all 
in the union of Knower and person Known in the act of mystical Knowledge 
and in the union of lover and beloved bound together in true, active love. 
But Lull understood not only the necessary activity of the divine persons 
ad intra, but also the contingent activity of God ad extra in creation as invol- 
ving correlatives of action. God is the absolute -tivurn by whose free choice 
the contingent -bile of the world is created. 
In his application of these ideas to the creation of the world, Lull strongly 
eAphasized not only the dynamic character of God's causal action, but also 
that of its effect, the created world itself. He applied the distinction between 
necessary activity ad extra and contingent activity ad intra to the activity of 
creatures. To explain how the distinction applies to creaturely activity, he 
drew on the distinction of accidents into proper and appropriated which he 
had found in Arabic writers. 
Fire, for example, must necessarily burn, but whether it heats water or 
burns wood is contingent. Within itself fire is active <<substantially>> and <<in 
a proper way>>; in water or earth it is active <<accidentally,> and ccin an appro- 
priated way>>. The form of whiteness is active within itself, but when it con- 
tingently whitens (albificat) this or that body, it is present in the body in a 
<ccontracted>> way. 
For Lull therefore creation is a likeness of God because of its dynamic 
character. Not only does God's activity of creation not cease with the besto- 
wal of being on the world, but the world which God has created is itself ac- 
tive, tending to its own perfection. Just as whiteness can seek to increment 
its contract perfection in an appropriated way by whitening more and more 
individual bodies, so also the creator has so created the various species that 
they tend to increase their perfection by numerical multiplication. 
But the individual concrete things in the world tend not only to their ex- 
trinsic, numerical multiplication. They tend also to their intrinsic, proper 
perfection. By nature each concrete thing strives to fulfill the abstract essen- 
ce from which it has emerged. 
But although the particular, individual things of which the world is made 
up are in process tending toward their intrinsic, proper perfection, no indivi- 
dual thing can attain the full perfection of its species. The species is the limit 
to which the perfection of the individual approaches, the genus that of the 
species, the universe that of the genera. 
It was in this sense that Lull maintained that the categories and predica- 
bles are real things. The abstract is already really present in individual things 
as the limit of their striving toward infinity. 
The distinction between necessary, proper activity and contingent, appro- 
priated activity was also crucial for Lull's idea of man. He defined rnan by 
way of his relationship both to God and to the world. 
With respect to creation, Lull held that rnan is a c<microcosm>>. Although 
he was referring to the traditional motif which saw rnan as a world in minia- 
ture, he modified the traditional understanding of this idea radically. Man is 
a microcosm because he forms the center of creation, uniting in himself the 
two fundamental divisions of being whickLul1 had found in Ibn Sab'in, the 
lowest level of intellectuel reality and the highest reach of sensible being. He 
is thus a bond which holds creation together. 
With respect to the creator, rnan is himself creative ad extra, bringing 
forth ideas, instruments, tools, and works of art. In producing instruments, 
rnan uses materials he finds in nature, but the forms he gives them are not 
mere imitations of natural things. They are true productions of his own 
mind. 
Man's creative power thus approaches that of God. But whereas God 
brings forth as real beings the things that he understands, man's mind is not 
able to produce real beings, it can only represent them and appropriate them 
to itself. 
The metaphysical distinction between necessary activity ad intra and con- 
tingent activity ad extra was fundamental for Lull's understanding of man 
above all because it enabled him to analyze more profoundly the nature of 
human knowledge. He had maintained that things like fire and whiteness 
have their own necessary, proper, and intrinsic correlatives of action, whe- 
reas their objects ad extra (earth or water, this or that body) are contingent 
and appropriated to them. 
In the very important late work De potentia, obiecto et actu Lull drew the 
consequences of this idea for human knowledge. The sensible things which 
the mind encounters in the world are not necessary objects of knowledge. 
Even the instruments and tools which the mind itself produces are objects 
appropriated by the mind to itself. The proper object of the mind must be an 
interior reality. Just as the proper object of fire is not earth or water, but ra- 
ther fire itself as ignitable, so also the proper object of the mind can only be 
the mind itself as knowable. 
From this vantage-point it is easy to appreciate the originality of Lull's Lo- 
gica nova. The logic of this work is new because it is meant to be a logic of 
pure knowing, a logic whose first intention is to consider the intellectuel 
things which are the proper objects of the intellect. It is only in a second in- 
tention that the new logic must consider the appropriated objects of the in- 
tellect, the ideas which the intellect abstracts from sensible things. 
Here Lull adopts the distinction between a first and a second intention, 
not as it was current in Latin logic, but as he had found it in the Brethren 
of Purity and Ibn Sab'in. In order to define the nature of logic, he identified 
it with the distinction between proper and appropriated qualities. 
Reflecting the idea of an ascent of the intellect, the second figure of Lull's 
Ars generalis ultima distinguishes three degrees of knowledge: sensible 
knowledge of sensible things, intellectual knowledge of sensible things, and 
intellectual knowledge of intellectual things. 
The Logica nova was conceived as a logic of pure knowing, a logic for the 
third degree of knowledge, the intellectual knowledge of intellectual things. 
But it is at the same time a critique of the traditional logic and the theory of 
knowledge on which it was based. For Lull, Aristotle's logic was deficient 
because it limited itself to the intellectual knowledge of sensible things. 
It is true that in the twelfth century certain Latin writers recognized the 
possibility of a logic for the intellectual knowledge of intellectual things. 
Following Boethius, they distinguished between intelligibilia, that is, the ob- 
jects of the second degree of knowledge, and intellectibilia, those of the third 
degree. But the thirteenth-century reception of Aristotle focused attention 
on the formulation of a logic of the second degree of knowledge, the in- 
tellectual knowledge of sensible things, and precluded an attempt to analyze 
the conditions of its possibility. 
This is the reason why Lull's prologue to the Logica nova speaks of the 
unstable character of the traditional logic and proposes to reconstruct it on 
a new foundation, that of the third degree of knowledge. 
Because it concerns intellectual knowledge of intellectual things, Lull spo- 
ke in his De modo naturali intelligendi of this highest degree of knowledge as 
a <<natural>> manner of knowing. Making use of his distinction between the 
necessary and the contingent correlatives of action, he regarded intellectual 
things as the necessary, intrinsic, proper objects of knowledge and criticized 
the traditional logic as one which treats only the contingent, extrinsic, appro- 
priated objects of knowledge, the sensible things encountered in this world. 
The traditional logic has limited itself to a c<peregrine>> manner of knowing. 
Man's true nature is spiritual and turned to intellectible things. But he 
must go out to corporeal reality and appropriate to himself sensible things in 
order to be able to return to his proper self. Corporeal things -the subjects 
of the Art, imaginativa, sensitiva, vegetativa, elementativa- are all only ins- 
truments for man's realization of reason in the world. It is for this reason 
that the Logica nova situates man on the border-line between spiritual and 
corporeal reality. 
Man's proper function -as homificans animal in the enigmatic definition 
of the Logica nova- is the hominization of the animal, vegetable, and ele- 
mental kingdoms, and through them of the whole universe. Man is a micro- 
cosm, a bond joining spiritual and corporeal reality because the -tivum of his 
rational nature is able to appropriate to itself the various objects which make 
up the universe. But the condition of the possibility of this appropriated 
knowledge lies in the proper, third degree of knowledge for which the Logi- 
ca nova is meant. 
CHARLES LOHR, Islamic influences in Lull's logic. 
La influencia de la lbgica islamica en el Llull primerenc (early Lull) és, en general, 
reconeguda. Partint de la hipotesi segons la qual el Llull madur (mature Lull) va con- 
tinuar el seu estudi de les fonts arabigues i aquestes fonts el van influir no només en 
la seva interpretació de la lbgica aristotelica, sinó també en el desenvolupament de 
1'Ars Magna, el ponent analitza diverses nocions especifiques de la Logica nova 
(1303) que podrien ser producte de la influkncia de la lbgica islamica i examina la ma- 
nera en quk el Beat va integrar aquestes nocions en la seva obra. 
CHARLES LOHR, Islamic influences in LUZZ'S logic. 
The influence of Islamic logic in early Llull is, in general, recognised. Starting from 
the hypothesis that the mature Llull continued his study of Arabic sources and that 
these sources not only influenced his interpretation of Aristotelian logic, but also the 
development of the Ars Magna, the author analyses various specific notions of the 
Logica Nova (New Logic), 1303, that could be the result of the influence of Islamic 
logic and examines the way in which Lull integrated these notions in to his work. 
